Sharad Shah
During the first two decades after independence, general elections to the Parliament and the State Assemblies were held simultaneously. But that happened as there was no meaningful opposition in those days, and to that extent, it was an imperfect democracy.
As the opposition developed, and due to the dissolution of certain State Assemblies in 1968 and 1969, followed by the dissolution of Parliament in 1970, and the subsequent general elections in 1971, the cycle of simultaneous elections was disrupted, and mid-term elections became the rule rather than exception. The frequent elections lead to massive expenditure by Government and contestants. Some other issues that have come to the fore since then are money and muscle power, cost and credibility of EVMs, and as a result, there is a visible erosion of faith in elections and electoral democracy.
The need for electoral reforms and synchronised elections to the Parliament and Assemblies, and even local bodies, have been debated all along. But when, in his Valedictory Address on the Law Day Celebrations 2017, the Prime Minister gave a call to start a constructive discussion on the issue, fresh momentum, and the matter, came into focus at various fora of the Government.
However, the supposed guidance, spelled out in [Niti Aayog’s Note] (http://www.niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf) (PDF), reads rather like a command performance, with a gathering of orchestrated support. The ensuing discussion, instead of investigating issues, degenerated into a political slugfest, and ended in a whimper.
Prudence demands that this debate is resumed immediately, the issues discussed, differences narrowed down and necessary legislative action started as soon as possible. But this does not seem to be happening, and very important and urgent reforms are back in cold storage. If there is any sincere intent to implement these much needed reforms, the time to do it is now before the public loses faith in elections and democracy completely. And so, here is a small attempt to bring the question of electoral reforms back to centre stage.
The work of drafting a constitution at any time is a humongous task. But we had the benefit of learning from other constitutions already working over the previous couple of centuries. Two important ones were the written U.S. constitution, and the unwritten British Constitution. The latter had an early start here when, slowly but surely, the British started transferring power to the Indian people. It was only natural that they followed the same basic rules that they had back at home.
This had two defects, that came to the fore within the first couple of decades. The first is the idea of a fixed term of five years of the Parliament, coupled with the right of the Prime Minister to dissolve the Parliament anytime, which leads to mid-term elections (Britain itself rectified this very recently and has curtailed this power of the Prime Minister). The other is that the fixed five year period implies that people express their will once every five years, and then shut up for the rest of the term – a rather long period of silence. Apart from this, it makes the elections unwieldy and expensive. These defects were magnified for us, because we not only have a Parliament, but 26 State Assemblies and 3 union territories, each representing, millions, even hundreds of millions of people.
Be warned – what is suggested hereafter is unprecedented, and way out of the box. It must be examined with scepticism, but tempered with an open mind, because it may be the disruptive game changer we so badly need.
The Parliament and the State Assemblies will be perpetual, with a five year term and 2% of the senior most members retiring every month. Thus, every month there will be about ten
simultaneous elections for seats vacated by retiring members in the ten Parliamentary Constituencies, all Assembly Constituencies and all local bodies in that Parliamentary constituency.
The first advantage of this will be that, though each citizen will still have only one opportunity in five years to speak up, collectively the electorate will speak every month. These results, of monthly elections, will provide the rulers, whoever they are, as a bellwether.
The second advantage will be that there will be no mid-term elections, and only a few bye-elections on the death of a sitting member. Even this can be avoided, by having a pair of elected candidates for every constituency, and on the death of a sitting member her term will be completed by the second.
The problem of the Election Commission (EC) is that it is in a seasonal business, like the Kumbh Mela. The 60 lakh or more EVMs required for simultaneous elections cost roughly Rs. 15,000 crores. During the working life of 15 years, they are used 3 times, or once every five years, costing Rs.5,000 crores per election.
On the other hand, if the elections are phased out over 5 years, as suggested above, the same EVM is used 60 times, and the total number needed drops to only 3 lakh EVMs, at a cost of Rs. 250 crores, even if the full cost is written off in 5 years, to take into account more intensive use, resulting in a saving of Rs.4,750 crores per election. (See Table 1). There are other savings, and the assumed costs are very conservative, so the actual saving may come close to Rs.10,000 crores.
Table I
Cost of EVMs (Rs)
| Total No of Booths | Rs 15 | lakhs | |
| EVMs per Booth | 4 | ||
| Lifetime Cost of EVM | Rs 25,000 | ||
| No of Elections in 15 yrs | 3 | ||
| One Phase | Sixty Phases | ||
| Life of EVMs in yrs | 15 | 5 | |
| No of Phases | 1 | 60 | |
| No of EVMs | 60 | 3 | |
| Per Election Cost of EVMs | 5,000 | 250 | Crores |
| Saving Per Election | 4,750 | Crores |
Note
- EVM Life is taken as 15 years for Simultaneous Elections, but 5 years for Staggered Elections, due to intense use. Also, it should be understood that newer developing technologies are inevitably going to result in a demand for continual upgradation of the design
- EVMs per Booth is taken as 4, but is more likely to be 5 or 6
State Financing of Elections
With a saving of this size in the cost of running the elections, the Commission can certainly consider the long standing proposal for the state financing of elections. If, for each Parliamentary Constituency, Rs 3 crore is provided for each Parliamentary candidate, and Rs 4 crores for Assembly candidates, the gross cost would be about Rs. 4,000 crores, comfortably covered by the above saving.
The EC should encourage candidates to use the Crowd Funding route to finance their elections, and it should devise and provide a mechanism to this end. The public, for instance, can buy Election Bonds (not the similarly named ones, currently structured to fund political parties in an opaque and dubious manner, for which an outraged public litigation is stagnating in the Supreme Court), and the money received may be disbursed to the candidate named in the bond.
After the elections the State Election Fund will be distributed among the first three candidates in
proportion of votes polled in their favour, discounting the votes polled by the rest of the candidates. If this amount is more than the amount received by way of Bonds, the Bond holders will be refunded their dues, with the balance accruing to the winning candidate. If the amount is less, it will be distributed among the bond holders in proportion of each one’s contribution, and the candidate will not get anything.
Such a measure will go a long way in diminishing the influence of money power at election. Table 2 illustrates how the state fund of Rs.3 Crores would be distributed among participating candidates in a typical case.
Table II
State Funding (Rs)
{State Funds Rs 300 Cr per Parliamentary Constituency)
| Candidate | Crowd Fund (Cr) | % Vote Share | % State Fund | State Fund (Cr) | Surplus (Cr) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 1.00 | 40 | 44 | 1.33 | 0.33 |
| B | 0.80 | 38 | 39 | 1.17 | 0.37 |
| C | 0.75 | 15 | 17 | 0.50 | 0.25 |
| D | 0.25 | 8 | x | x | x |
| E | 0.30 | 2 | x | x | x |
| Total | 3.10 | 90 | 100 | 3.00 | 0.45 |
With Staggered Elections, there will be no dissolution of the Parliament, and no mid-term elections (almost – the rare exception is described below), and the Parliament will be a continuing entity, with members who retire after their five year terms being substituted by newly elected members.
If there is a vacancy due to resignation or death of both alternate members, a mid-term election can be held, if the remaining term is more than two and a half years, otherwise the seat can remain vacant for the remaining term. There is also another option. At the time of election itself, as part of the process of filing electoral declarations, every candidate must name a Nominee, who will take her place for the remaining term in case of his death or resignation. The alternate elected member steps in when the Nominee is also not available, and this person, naturally, is going to be representing a different political ideology, party or viewpoint.
If the party in power loses the confidence of the House, and no other party can form a
government, the Parliament can elect a committee of ten members, by a single transferable
vote, and the President will rule, with advice and consent from this Committee. To provide
checks and balances, the full Parliament will still have the power to overrule any decision of the
President, by a two third majority. This will continue until some party comes to the President
with the requisite majority support. This amounts to temporarily adopting the US model (‘Washminster’) – Westminster in normal times, and Washminster as a fallback.
Rationalising the EC Operations
A weakness of the EC is that it is almost entirely dependent on the staff on loan from the administration for conduct of election. And with the seasonal nature of its work, it cannot be otherwise. But once the work is perennial, this need not be so. The EC can have a larger staff of its own with full allegiance to it with limited borrowed staff at lower levels for the duration of election in that section. This can be done by creating an Indian Election Service, which will be answerable only to the President, through the Chairman of the Election Commission.
There are also many other pending issues that need to be resolved as soon as possible.
Therefore it is very important that one or more competent committees are appointed immediately, to look at constitutional, financial, legal and all other aspects of election reforms, in a time-bound manner, followed by legislative action, to ensure that the elections of 2029, if not 2024, are conducted under such revised laws.